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Abstract 
 
The existing finance literature is inadequate with respect to its coverage of the debt structure of small and medi-
um sized enterprises (SMEs). In addition, the role of trust in accessing finance for such enterprises is under-
investigated. This paper presents a mathematical model for optimizing the debt structure of SMEs that, since 
SMEs are often equity constrained, focuses on optimizing debt structure by minimizing its cost. The model is 
then extended by incorporating the level of trust that suppliers and bank managers have in the enterprise. The 
extended model, suggests that the higher the level of trust that bank managers and suppliers have in the SME, 
the more short-term finance an SME can obtain and should use. 
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I. Introduction 
It is possible to distinguish two separate strands in the literature on firms’ capital 
structure. On the one hand, there is the research rooted in the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
model, which is based on the assumption of perfect markets. This stream of research focuses 
mainly on modeling, theoretically, the capital structure decision (that is, the mix between eq-
uity and debt) of large corporations. On the other hand, there is the empirical research on cap-
ital structure of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and on SME lending relation-
ships. This stream of research draws attention to the difficulty faced by SMEs in relying on 
equity to finance their expansion (Berger et al., 1998; Gregory et al., 2005; Mueller, 2011; 
Ang, 1992). This difficulty applies particularly where the owners and the managers of the 
firm are the same people and when they are reluctant to open the equity holding to new 
shareholders, as is often the case with SMEs. Here the owner/manager is typically very much 
concerned with not losing control of the firm, in order to pass it on to the next generation 
(José López-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar, 2007; Romano et al., 2000; Porta et al., 1999). 
Consequently they do not like to access external equity finance, since it implies a reduction in 
their freedom in managing the firm and the implementation of (often very costly) additional 
control and management tools (Delmar, 2000). In addition, firms with concentrated owner-
ship are found to under-invest and therefore are less appealing for the external providers of 
equity (Danielson and Scott, 2007). Therefore, potential investors face formidable problems 
in valuing the venture and making investment decisions.  
Thus, a complex mix of ownership and financial factors have important consequences 
for how SMEs are financed: they do not typically seek external funds in the form of equity, 
and the equity invested in the venture consists entirely of the funds provided by the entrepre-
neurs and their families and by the profit shareholders decide to retain in the firm (Ang, 1992; 
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007). When the firm needs additional funds to expand, the 
original funders are often not able to provide additional equity. In fact, SMEs’ shareholders 
usually invest in the venture all (or at least the largest part of) their wealth at the beginning 
(Ang, 1992; Avery et al., 1998), and they typically do not hold a diversified portfolio of in-
vestments; therefore, their risk is much higher than that of a diversified investor (Kerins et al., 
2004). As a result, these firms tend to be equity constrained, and their alternative option is to 
obtain additional bank finance or leverage their trade credit capability (Berger et al., 1998; 
Howorth, 2001). All in all, trade credit and bank debt (a mix of long-term and short-term 
debt) have a key role in SMEs. 
The present paper, by focusing on debt, elaborates a theoretical model for optimizing 
the bank debt structure for SMEs. The model is based on the empirical observations that 
firms rely heavily on trade credit irrespective of its cost, and that short-term bank debt is typ-
ically more expensive than long-term bank debt. However, when a firm finances its activities 
with long-term bank debt, it will be charged the interest even when it does not use the credit 
provided, but when the firm uses short-term bank debt, it pays only for the credit used. As a 
result, because of the existence of a difference between the cost of short-term and long-term 
debt, there is scope to determine the optimal mix of debt that satisfies the desire of diversifi-
cation of financing sources and minimizes its cost.  
After elaborating the basic model for optimizing debt structure, a model that incorpo-
rates the role of trust is developed. Trusting relationships can help firms access trade credit 
and in the case of bank debt, trust can curb the negative effect of information asymmetries; 
trust is therefore expected to impact both the cost of credit and the amount obtained (Howorth 
and Moro, 2006).  Indeed, the extended model suggests that high levels of trust can increase 
the amount of trade credit, both in good and in bad times (by extending the payment terms), 
even if trust does not affect the cost of trade credit. In addition, trust increases short-term 
credit access and it reduces the cost of short-term debt. Thus the model has two practical im-
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plications. Firstly, the higher the level of suppliers’ and banks’ trust in the SME, the greater 
the availability of both trade credit and short-term bank debt. Secondly, the higher the trust, 
the more the firm should rely on short-term bank debt because of its reduced cost. All in all, 
highly trusted firms should increase the proportion of short-term liabilities (trade and bank 
credit) in order to optimize their debt structure. This implies that trust helps SMEs to build up 
a more flexible capital structure.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature on the 
factors affecting capital structure decisions in SMEs and on the nature of trust and how it can 
affect financing relationships. Section 3 discusses in detail the sources of finance for owner-
managed firms and presents the mathematical model for optimizing the debt structure. Sec-
tion 4 elaborates the extended model by incorporating the role of trust. Section 5 discusses 
the implications of the model for the financial management of SMEs. Section 6 draws con-
clusions and suggests some future research directions. 
 
II. Capital Structure in SMEs and Trusting Relationships 
The most commonly used term in the literature to describe the capital structure of 
firms is “puzzle.” It recurs in various titles of academic papers and effectively describes the 
problem of finding the optimal structure in financing firms and projects. The foundation of 
the finance literature theoretically considers the modeling of the optimal capital structure for 
corporations and is based on the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) which 
demonstrates that it is impossible to increase the value of firm by simply modeling a different 
capital structure (and therefore specifying an optimal capital structure). In fact, later research 
demonstrated that the value of the firm is affected by the capital structure when the role of 
taxes is incorporated in the model (Brick and Ravid, 1985). Moreover, the impact of refinanc-
ing costs (Jun and Jen, 2003), the probability of going bankrupt (Philosophov and 
Philosophov, 2005), the role of bank debt seniority (Longhofer and Santos, 2000) and the 
country bankruptcy regime (Ongena and Smith, 2000; Hall et al., 2004) were all found to af-
fect optimal capital structure. Other research addresses the agency costs (Fama, 1980) and the 
moral hazard risk (Jensen, 1986). Some scholars focus on the debt structure as a signaling 
device where short-term debt signals the high quality of the assets (Flannery, 1986). The 
greater flexibility of short-term debt is also stressed (Sharpe, 1991). 
 
II.1 Equity and Retained Profit 
The main problem with the foregoing research and models is that they are primarily 
concerned with organizations that can easily access both equity and debt. What about firms 
that, for various reasons, are constrained in accessing equity? This is the typical situation 
faced by young firms (LaRocca et al., in press) and by SMEs, when the owners are unwilling 
to open the shareholdings to new shareholders (Ang, 1992).  
Indeed, research indicates that SMEs have special features that at least partially ham-
per them in accessing additional equity (Ang, 1992; Ang et al., 1995; Ang et al., 2000). First-
ly, raising finance in regulated markets is subject to constraints for small opaque firms that 
suffer from big information asymmetries (Berger et al., 2001; Berger and Udell, 1998). Only 
as firms become older, larger, and more informationally transparent, do their financial op-
tions become more attractive: they can access public equity funding as well as public long-
term debt (Gregory et al., 2005). Secondly, SMEs capital structure is linked to the control of 
the firm; the owners are very much concerned with not losing control in order to pass the firm 
on to the next generation of the family. Therefore, SMEs tend to rely more on internal financ-
ing, even when it means constraining the growth of the firm. Thirdly, pure investors and SME 
entrepreneurs are different because of the non pecuniary benefits enjoyed by the former. In-
deed, empirical research indicates that they can enjoy non-pecuniary benefits as high as 20% 
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of their investment (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). Fourthly, the median entre-
preneurial earnings after 10 years of business are found to be 35% less than the predicted al-
ternative wage on a paid job of the same duration (Hamilton, 2000). This apparently illogical 
outcome can be justified by the freedom entrepreneurs enjoy to decide what to do and by the 
social prestige linked to running their own business. In addition, it is suggested that the entre-
preneurs’ possibility of exerting power over others is an important factor in deciding to start 
and to run their own business. All these benefits are highly valued by owners of SMEs, but 
they tend to clash with the interests of the external providers of equity. Fifthly, when the 
SMEis managed by the owners, it might benefit from incurring lower agency costs (Ang et 
al., 2000), even if Brau’s (2002) empirical evidence suggests that there is no real reduction in 
agency costs suggesting that further research on this topic is appropriate. Thus, as suggested 
by Romano et al. (2000) and by Chittenden et al. (1996.), a complex mix of social, family, 
cultural and financial factors influence capital structure.  
Entrepreneurs can also access finance from friends and relatives (Elston and 
Audretsch, in press; Landström, 1992). This is quite common for very new, innovative firms 
since they struggle to access traditional, formal sources of finance because of the lack of 
credit history, because of the innovativeness of the business idea or of the product/service 
they deliver, and because of doubts about the skills and competences of the entrepreneurs. 
Nevertheless, the access to family and friends finance is limited both in terms of amount and 
in terms of time (Ebben and Johnson, 2006). The amount is limited to the availability of 
funds from friends and family members. In addition, friends and relatives typically expect to 
be repaid after a relatively short period, since they are not proper investors: their decision to 
provide finance is not driven by a clear expectation in terms of return on investment, but 
simply by the desire to be supportive to a friend/relative. Indeed, access to formal sources of 
finance improves as the venture survives the start up period and implicitly the entrepreneurs 
demonstrate their capability to be successful. Thus, as time goes by, the entrepreneur can re-
duce the need to rely on family and friends finance (Avery et al., 1998). 
Entrepreneurs can also finance the firm via retained profit; pecking order theory by 
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that firms prefer to finance the growth firstly with retained 
profit and then with other sources, since retained profit is the cheapest source of finance. In 
fact, retained profit may be withdrawn for personal use or reinvested at the owner-manager’s 
discretion, and what drives the entrepreneur’s decision is not only the cost of that source of 
finance. Indeed, whether an entrepreneur chooses to withdraw or reinvest retained profits is 
likely to depend on a host of factors relating to the personal characteristics of the entrepre-
neur (Ang et al., 1995; Hamilton, 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). These 
characteristics include the time horizon and attitude to risk (Mueller, 2011): an entrepreneur 
planning to retire in six months may well have a different time preference with regard to pre-
sent versus future income from one hoping to expand the business over the next twenty years 
(Cassar, 2004; Degryse et al., forthcoming); a highly risk-averse owner-manager may prefer 
to take the money now rather than leave it invested in a potentially risky venture 
(Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007). The stage of the business’s products’ life cycles (e.g. 
‘star’ versus ‘cash cow’) may also influence the decision whether to leave profits invested in 
the business to withdraw them. Last but not least, the possibility of financing firms’ growth 
using retained profit is linked to the firm’s capability of generating profit and converting 
profit (an accounting measure) into cash available to the entrepreneur. All in all, there are 
many factors that affect the entrepreneur’s decision whether to retain profit in the firm or to 
withdraw it that are over and above the mere cost of this source of finance. Consequently, 
retained profit cannot be included in a generalizable optimization model based on its cost. To 
sum up, the decision concerning the amount of equity and retained profit that the entrepre-
neur should invest in the venture is not linked only (or even primarily) to the financial fac-
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tors. Moreover, the amount of new equity and retained profit that entrepreneurs can access is 
severely constrained. Thus, equity and retained profit are typically a given (at least in the 
short- term) in SMEs capital structure optimization.  
 
II.2 Bank Finance and Trade Credit 
SMEs might rely also on very specific financing tools like leasing and factoring (Beck 
and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Deloof et al., 2007). In addition, SMEs are found to rely on boot-
strap finance (Wingborg and Landström, 2000), that is on informal sources of finance like the 
use of personal credit cards and personal loans. However, these sources can typically cover 
only a small proportion of the financial needs and very often for a very short period (this 
holds particularly true for the use of personal credit cards or personal loans). Indeed, in the 
studies quoted above, the use of owner-related sources of finance significantly decreased over 
time while the use of trade credit increased (Ebben and Johnson, 2006). 
In fact, SMEs tend to rely mainly on banks (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and 
Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998), and on trade credit (Summers and Wilson, 2002; Atanasova and 
Wilson, 2003; Petersen and Rajan, 1997) to finance their operation. 
Bank credit is found to be the most important source of finance for firms (Bornheim 
and Herbeck, 1998; Angelini et al., 1998; Binks et al., 2006; Cole, 1998), and is granted ac-
cording to different lending technologies (Berger and Udell, 2006). Heyman et al. (2008) 
suggest that maturity matching between debt and the life of assets plays an important role in 
deciding the length of the debt used to finance the firm, since the matching provides the min-
imum risk maturity structure. Short-term debt is positively correlated with a firm’s growth 
opportunities (García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2007), it is higher in stronger and more 
flexible firms, when there are big differences between short-term and long-term interest rates 
and when firms have more growth opportunities. Some research investigates specifically the 
role short-term debt has in SMEs. It is regarded as a good tool for the bank that can act rapid-
ly to recoup the principal on the arrival of bad news (Landier and Thesmar, 2009). Some re-
search indicates that the determinants of the amount of short-term debt and long-term debt 
used are different. For instance, short-term debt is not affected by the trade off between tax 
benefits and bankruptcy costs; long-term debt is affected by collateralizable assets but short-
term debt is not (Pindado et al., 2006). All in all, SMEs rely heavily on bank finance but there 
is no definitive understanding of its use, and it is not clear whether they optimize it. 
An additional important source of finance for SMEs is trade credit. It is used by SMEs 
since it is easily accessible and is also considered to be a signaling device about the firm its 
products and future prospects (Paul and Wilson, 2006). The better the quality of the firm, the 
higher the overall trade credit it can obtain. Cuñat (2006) stresses that trade credit can be a 
two- or one-part contract. In the former case, customers are entitled to receive a discount if it 
pays immediately; in the latter case, customers do not receive any discount if they pay cash. 
For the two parts contract, the cost of trade credit is defined as the discount received by cus-
tomers if they pay cash. Previous research provides strong evidence that, in the case of two 
part contracts, the cost of trade credit is very high (Huyghebaert et al., 2007; Cuñat, 2006; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994), raising questions about the rationale of using it to finance the firm 
instead of using bank debt or equity. Nevertheless, various previous studies provide different 
explanations (Huyghebaert et al., 2007; Deloof and Jegers, 1996; Atanasova and Wilson, 
2003; García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2010). One suggested argument for relying on 
trade credit is the fact that trade credit is the most easily obtainable source of finance for 
firms (Huyghebaert, 2006), definitely easier to obtain than bank finance (Petersen and Rajan, 
1997). Moreover, often, the firms have to finance their activity with trade credit since they 
either do not access bank finance at all (this happens typically for very young firms) or they 
are constrained in the amount of bank credit they can obtain. Furthermore, suppliers are typi-
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cally more supportive to customers when they need extended credit than banks are (Howorth 
and Reber, 2003; García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2010) by extending credit granted 
and/or by supplying additional services/goods (Cuñat, 2006). Interestingly, the extended trade 
credit is costless since suppliers do not charge extra fees to the customers. In fact, suppliers 
are in a better position than banks to evaluate the credit quality of the customer, they have 
more tools to enforce proper behavior by the customer and therefore have greater control over 
the credit provided (Cuñat, 2006). The decision to rely on trade credit is also based on the 
benefits of diversifying the sources of finance (Tsuruta, 2008) since different providers of 
finance utilize different information and rely on different approaches to monitor firm’s cre-
ditworthiness (Howorth and Reber, 2003), trade credit access and bank credit access are 
largely independent. It is therefore argued that the high price of trade credit incorporates an 
insurance premium that customers pay in order to be sure of obtaining (non-bank) credit 
when other sources of finance (typically banks) dry up (Tsuruta, 2008). 
In summary then, SMEs are constrained in financing their operation and growth by re-
lying on equity and retained profit. Thus, they have to turn to short- and long-term bank debt 
and trade credit where the decision concerning which source of finance to use is only partial-
ly affected by their relative costs. 
 
II.3 Trust and Financing Decisions 
The research on the sources of finance for SMEs pays only marginal attention to trust 
as a distinct factor that affects the relationship between the provider and user of finance, in 
recent times a growing interest has emerged (Ferrary, 2003; Howorth and Moro, 2006; 
Saparito and Gopalakrishnan, 2009). Nevertheless, when a bank or a supplier makes a deci-
sion to provide credit, even though the granting of credit is a contractual relationship, it is un-
derpinned by an assessment of trust. In fact, including trust shifts the attention from the tradi-
tional approach linked to transaction costs economics and agency theory to a wider and more 
complex perspective where interpersonal ties and relationships are taken into consideration 
(Barney, 1990; Deutsch, 1958; Mayer et al., 1995; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). The crucial 
role of trust is evidenced by research that approaches economic exchange with this wider per-
spective: the presence of trust reduces agency problems (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992); cuts 
transaction costs (Macaulay, 1963) and affects a firm’s boundaries as defined by transaction 
cost economics (Langfield-Smith, 2008). Trust supports inter-firm cooperation (Doz, 1996; 
Ven and Ring, 2006), relationships (Fisman and Khanna, 1999), and alliances (Gulati, 1995); 
aids decision making when information is scarce (Luhmann, 2000), and affects performance 
(McEvily and Zaheer, 2006). At an organizational level, Bradach and Eccles (1989) identify 
trust as an alternative to market-based and hierarchy-based control proposed by traditional 
institutional economies (Williamson, 1988). Trust aids decision making in a situation where 
information is scarce (Luhmann, 2000), and high levels of trust are purported to encourage 
trustworthy behavior (Nooteboom, 2002). Previous research has also developed tools for 
measuring trust. The trust inventories produced by Cummings and Bromiley (1996); Currall 
and Judge (1995); Mayer and Davies (1999); Jarvenpaa et al. (1998) are mainly based on the 
model by Mayer et al. (1995). 
A widely accepted model of how trust works is provided by Mayer et al. (1995). 
These authors suggest that trustworthiness is based on three factors: ability, benevolence, 
and integrity. Ability looks at attributes such as skills and competence; it is domain spe-
cific and it cannot necessarily be generalized to other situations. When suppliers perceive 
a high level of ability in the customer (Mayer et al., 1995), they are more confident of the 
customer’s capability of paying for the goods or services provided. Trust can help obtain 
trade credit even in difficult times, when perceived ability can increase the confidence of 
the supplier in the SME owner/manager’s capability of surviving the difficulties. Simi-
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larly, a high level of perceived ability can positively affect the credit access because of 
the increased loan manager confidence in the entrepreneur’s capability of repaying the 
debt (Howorth and Moro, 2006; Hernandez-Canovas and Martınez-Solano, 2010). Thus, 
trust can support the provision of credit and its extension both from suppliers and banks. 
Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is believed to voluntarily do good to the 
trustor and, thus, it is relationship specific. If the supplier thinks that that the customer is 
likely to behave in a way that is not detrimental to the supplier, clearly the supplier will 
be more inclined to give trade credit and extend it when requested. Similar reasoning can 
be applied to the access to bank credit as suggested by Howorth and Moro (2006). Integ-
rity is the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles considered 
acceptable to the trustor; it is not linked to skills or competences, nor is it relationship 
specific (morality is over and above each specific relationship). Integrity, as an intrinsic 
part of an individual’s commitment to moral principles, is a personal characteristic of the 
SME owner/manager. A high level of perceived integrity in the customer can reduce the 
expectation of moral hazard, as well as increasing the perceived reliability of information 
supplied by the firm, increasing the access to both trade credit and bank credit. 
Usually, bank managers have some discretion on the interest rate charged on 
overdraft and this can be renegotiated easily according to changes in firm-bank relations. 
Indeed, Harhoff and Körting (1998) as well as Howorth and Moro (2012) find empirical 
evidence of a negative relationship between trust and interest rate on short-term debt. 
Brau (2002) found that banks do not charge a premium when the firm is not managed by 
the owner, because the main determinants of interest rate tend to be the length of the re-
lationship and by firm size (not ownership/management structure). In contrast, the inter-
est rate charged on long-term debt is contractually determined at the beginning of the 
contract. Not only is the interest rate less subject to negotiation when the contract is 
signed, but it cannot reflect the current relationship between the bank and the firm. Thus, 
the cost of long-term debt is assumed to be independent of trust. 
All in all, trust bestowed by the supplier and by the bank manager on the entre-
preneur affects the entrepreneur’s access to trade credit and to short-term debt.  
 
III. Debt Optimization: The Model 
In this section we elaborate the basic model for the optimization of the debt structure 
of the firm. The following section will theoretically extend the model by incorporating trust-
ing relationships in the model, and it will examine trust impact on capital structure. 
An SME’s financial structure can be summarized as follows: 
 
F = E + TC + STD + LTD     (1) 
 
where F is the total finance the firm needs, E is the equity provided by shareholders and the 
retained profit belonging to them, TC is trade credit provided by suppliers, and STD and LTD 
are respectively short- and long-term debt provided by banks.  
As discussed above, equity and retained profits at best have a limited capability of fi-
nancing the firm. Thus, our concern is with modeling the optimal debt structure of the ven-
ture, and therefore we focus on trade credit and bank debt (both in the form of short- and 
long-term debt).  
 
III.1 Trade Credit 
The overall amount of trade credit the firm can obtain is a matter of negotiation with 
the suppliers and is affected by the relative power (usually low) the SMEs have, as well as by 
suppliers’ marketing strategy (Summers and Wilson, 2002). The amount of trade credit fi-
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nancing employed by the firm is significantly influenced by the nature of its operations and 
the resultant cost structure. Indeed, if a large proportion of the firm’s costs are accounted for 
by materials and services purchased externally, the firm can access a higher level of trade 
credit financing than if this proportion is low and the majority of costs are accounted for by 
the firm’s own labor force. Thus, firms that rely on out-sourcing can leverage more trade 
credit than those that rely on in-sourcing. Nevertheless, trade credit does not have a fixed and 
clear cost: where there is a one-part contract (and the cost of trade credit is embedded in the 
overall cost of the goods or services purchased) there is no benefit to the customer in paying 
cash; where there is a two-part contract, the cost of credit can be easily determined as the dis-
count received by customers if they pay cash (Cuñat, 2006). The cost of trade credit incorpo-
rates three components. Firstly, the cost of credit reflects the pure interest paid to the supplier 
for the credit provided. Secondly, it incorporates an insurance premium that the customer 
pays in order to be sure of receiving credit if other sources of finance (typically banks) dry 
up. Thirdly, it includes an additional premium which customers are willing to pay for diversi-
fying the sources of finance. Such diversification reduces the financial risk resulting from re-
liance on one or a few sources of finance that are correlated with each other. Thus, in the case 
of two part contracts, SMEs have to balance the cost incurred by utilizing trade credit and the 
overall perceived benefits obtained by the diversification of the sources of finance. 
Thus, the amount of trade credit utilized is a function of the operation structure of the 
firm  and the perceived benefit of trade credit. Let us define the net perceived benefit of using 
trade credit (that is the monetary and non monetary benefits implicit in using trade credit less 
the cost – i.e. the missed discount – of using trade credit) as TCW , where 10  TCW . Here 
the value approaches 0 when the entrepreneur does not perceive any benefit in relying on 
trade credit (i.e. when the offered discount is very high and the entrepreneur does not need to 
diversify the sources of finance or/and has cash available in a bank). Conversely, the value 1 
means that the entrepreneur perceives relying on trade credit as highly beneficial (such as 
when there is no cost in using trade credit because no discount is provided, or when entrepre-
neur would like to diversify the sources of finance or when entrepreneur needs trade credit 
since they cannot pay in cash because they lack ready money/bank finance). In addition, let 
us define the amount of outsourced services and raw materials bought by the firm as M and 
the number of days that trade credit is granted for by d. Thus, we can define the trade credit 
used as: 
tcW
d
MTC
365
      (2) 
Here, 
365
d
M  represents the available trade credit while tcW  (as illustrated above) is the pro-
pensity to use trade credit. Clearly, the higher the cost of trade credit with respect to the per-
ceived benefits gained by diversifying the sources of finance, the lower the value of TCW , and 
therefore the lower the amount of trade credit used, other things being equal. 
In reality, many SMEs are continually strapped for cash (given the amount forthcom-
ing from other sources), and so entrepreneurs’ perception of the benefits linked to relying on 
trade credit is very high. This approach can be suboptimal in terms of the determination of 
the amount of trade credit employed in financing the operation when one looks only at its 
cost; nevertheless, it is the only possibility the entrepreneurs have when they are constrained 
in accessing bank credit. Moreover, entrepreneurs highly value the possibility of accessing 
the credit needed and the flexibility in accessing it (Agarwal et al., 2006; Berlin, 1996). Ex-
tensive use of trade credit grants entrepreneurs such flexibility and thus they tend to use the 
maximum trade credit available, irrespective of its cost. The amount of trade credit TCW  con-
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sidered appropriate to use is largely independent of its cost since it is affected by the negotia-
tion power of the entrepreneur; the cash in the firm’s bank account; the possibility of the en-
trepreneur accessing bank credit instead of trade credit (indeed, if the bank does not provide 
credit the entrepreneur is forced to turn to trade credit); the entrepreneur’s personal prefer-
ences; the entrepreneur’s perceived benefits linked to additional flexibility in credit; the in-
surance provided if banks freeze the credit; the personal relationships with bank and suppli-
ers. Thus, in a capital structure model that relies on minimizing the cost of finance, trade 
credit has to be considered an exogenous variable. 
 
III.2 Bank Debt: The Short-Term and Long-Term Mix 
Short-term debt is a financial tool that should cover the financial needs left uncovered 
by other forms of financing. It is expected to be a temporary source of finance. The habitual 
use of short-term debt means that the firm needs financing in excess of temporary and occa-
sional needs. In other words, when the firm uses short-term debt continuously, it transforms 
de facto short-term debt to some kind of medium long-term debt. The steady use of short-
term debt means that the firm is not correctly matching the life of the assets and the debt used 
to finance them. Such a mismatch implicitly increases the firm’s financial risk (Heyman et 
al., 2008). Here an important question arises: what is the level of long-term debt, defined as
0D , that is optimal in the sense that the overall amount of interest paid (on short- and long-
term debt) is minimized during a period (say one year)? Let 
Lr be the interest rate for long-
term debt, Sr  the rate for short-term debt, and the reinvestment rate Rr  for interest earned on a 
positive account balance. For our optimization model to be operationalized, it is necessary to 
assume that RLS rrr  . In fact, the interest paid on short-term deposits (i.e. what the bank 
pays to the provider of the funds) has to be smaller than the interest rate charged to customers 
who are using the funds; otherwise, the bank would receive less than it pays. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that firms pay a higher interest rate on short-term debt than on long-term debt 
support for this proposition is found by, for example, Degryse et al. (forthcoming). There are 
different possible explanations for this phenomenon: for instance, the long-term debt is often 
collateralized and therefore the bank is hedged in case of default. In addition, banks might 
charge short-term debt with additional management fees (which in our model are included in 
the short-term interest rate) linked to the additional management costs the banks incur (for 
instance, the regular revision of the line of credit, the production of monthly bank accounts 
statements, the management of payments and receipts, etc.). 
If the account balance b is known for every day of the year, the total interest paid over 
a year can be calculated by summing the daily interest paid for the short-term debt Db  
(when this is negative), subtracting the interest earned on the amount Db  (when this is 
positive), and adding the annual interest DrL  for the long-term debt. While this can be done 
retrospectively, the daily account balances will not be known precisely in advance, and it is 
sensible to specify the financial requirements of the firm by a distribution function 0)( bC  
for the account balance b , which could be derived by making assumptions about future cash 
flow. Given a cumulative distribution function 


x
C dbbCxF )()( , the distribution function 
)(bC  describes how often an account balance b  is available, in the sense that the integral 
over an interval 
)()()( 12
2
1
bFbFdbbC CC
b
b
      (3) 
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specifies what fraction of days of the year the account balance lies between 
1b  and 2b , or, in 
other words, it gives the probability that on any given day the account balance lies within this 
range. In practice, there will be a minimum and maximum balance, so 0)( bC  outside a cer-
tain range of values, and the integral will reduce to a finite domain. However, it might be use-
ful to allow for an infinite range: for instance to be able to use a simple normal (Gaussian) 
distribution as a model. 
The total interest I , paid over a year is a function of the long-term debt level 0D , 
which contributes DrL  to the annual interest. The account balance is Db  , so short-term 
debt at rate Sr  is only needed if 0 Db  or, in other words, if Db  . On the other hand, 
when Db  , the account balance is positive, and the firm gains interest at rate Rr . The total 
interest payment per year is thus 






D
R
D
SL dbDbbCrdbDbbCrDrDI )()()()()(    (4) 
The optimal choice for the long-term debt D , is the value that minimizes this function. The 
derivative of )(DI  with respect to D  is where the two integrals are the areas under the dis-
tribution function )(bC  to the left and right of D , representing the fraction of time the ac-
count balance is below and above D , respectively. Using the cumulative distribution func-
tion CF , this expression simplifies to 
 )(1)( DFrDFrr
Dd
Id
CRCSL      (5) 
which can be written as 
)()( DFrrrr
Dd
Id
CRSRL      (6) 
The minimum is obtained when this derivative is zero, hence the optimal value of D  is de-
termined by the condition 
RS
RL
C
rr
rr
DF


 )(      (7) 
This means that the optimal value of long term debt D  has to be chosen such that the fraction 
of time the account balance falls below D  equals the ratio of interest rates on the right-
hand side of the equation above. 
 
III.3 Drawing It All Together: The Financial Model 
Having identified the different sources of finance for an owner-managed SME, it 
is time now to present the overall model for optimizing the firm’s financing structure. 
The model, therefore, is as follows: 
F = E + 
TCW
d
M
365
 + 





D
D
L
dbDbbCdbDbbCD )()()()(   (8) 
where E is initial equity plus retained profit and is given, 
TCW
d
M
365
 is the trade credit used 
that is decided ex ante, D  is the long term debt, 



D
L
dbDbbC ))(()(   is the (average) short-
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term debt, 



D
dbDbbC )()(  is the (average) cash in the bank. The proportion of long and 
short-term credit is optimized according to 
RS
RL
C
rr
rr
DF


 )( . 
 
IV. The Extended Model: The Impact of Trust on Debt Structure 
In order to examine the role of trust on debt structure, we examine separately its 
impact on trade credit and on bank debt.  
As discussed above, the amount of credit extended d , is affected by the level of 
trust, since high perceived ability increases the perception that the entrepreneurs will be 
successful in running their business and in repaying debt; high perceived benevolence 
supports the belief that the entrepreneur will do their best to repay the debt in order to 
avoid problems for the supplier; high integrity means perceiving the values and ethics of 
the entrepreneur as similar to those of the supplier which increases the confidence that 
the entrepreneur’s behavior will be beneficial to the supplier. Thus, the number of days 
of credit granted, which takes into consideration the level of trust, can be defined as 
)(d . Trust affects the cost of trade credit only in two-part contracts. In such contracts, 
trust does not affect the pure interest paid to the supplier since this is simply the remu-
neration for providing extended payment terms (it covers the cost the suppliers incur by 
providing extend payment terms). Also, trust does not affect the extra premium custom-
ers pay for keeping their sources of finance diversified; higher levels of perceived ability, 
benevolence, and integrity in the customer are unrelated to what the customer is prepared 
to pay to diversify their sources of finance. In fact, higher levels of perceived ability and 
benevolence should impact the insurance premium the customer is charged in order to be 
sure of receiving credit when other sources of finance (typically banks) dry up (since 
such a premium is linked to the perceived riskiness of the customer). All in all, custom-
ers typically do not benefit significantly from a reduced interest rate because of high lev-
els of trust for at least three reasons. Firstly, trust might affect only one of the three com-
ponents of the discount. Secondly, suppliers tend to apply standard discounts in order to 
simplify the management of the payment system. Thirdly the discount for early payment 
is not a matter of negotiation between the parties. Thus, the firm’s decision about how 
much trade credit to utilize TCW , is not affected by the level of trust placed by suppliers. 
The exogenous component, trade credit, as defined by equation (2) can be re-
defined as 
TCW
d
M
365
)(
     (9) 
where )(d  is the number of days of trade credit according to the level of trust and 
dd )(  when the trust in the entrepreneur ( ) is higher than the trust in the average 
customer and dd )(  when the trust in the entrepreneur ( ) is lower than that in the 
average customer. 
The level of long-term debt 0)( D  is optimal when the total amount of interest 
paid is minimized. Since the short-term interest rate may depend on trust (Howorth and 
Moro, 2012), we will consider it as a )(Sr , which can be assumed to decrease with increas-
ing trust  . The model depends on the assumption that, whatever the level of trust, 
RLS rrr )( . Thus, it is now possible to re-write the total interest cost as expressed in equa-
tion 4 as: 
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





)(
)(
)(
))(()())(()()()())((




D
R
D
L
SL dbDbbCrdbDbbCrDrDI  (10) 
As previously, the optimal choice for the long-term debt )(D  is the value that mini-
mizes I . By deriving I with respect to D  and simplifying the expression, we find that the 
optimum value of long-term debt, )(D  , is determined by the condition 
RS
RL
C
rr
rr
DF



)(
))((

      (11) 
As in the basic model, the equation implies that )(D  has to be chosen so that the 
fraction of time the account balance falls below )(D  equals the ratio of interest rates on 
the right-hand side of the equation. To calculate this value, knowledge of the cumulative dis-
tribution of funding is required. The assumptions concerning the interest rates imply that the 
fraction on the right-hand side is always a number between 0 and 1, so there is always a 
unique optimal solution. Interestingly, since trust reduces the value of the denominator of 
equation (11), the implication is that the higher the level of trust, the greater the proportion of 
short-term debt (since higher levels of trust increase )(D  i.e. the negative level of long 
term debt). The original model can therefore be refined as 
F = E + 
TCW
d
M
365
)(
 + 





)(
)(
)(
))(()())(()()(




D
D
L
dbDbbCdbDbbCD  (12) 
where E is initial equity plus retained profit, 
TCW
d
M
365
)(
 is the trade credit obtained, )(D  
is the long term debt, 



)(
)(
))(()(



D
L
dbDbbC  is the (average) short-term debt, 




)(
))(()(


D
dbDbbC  is the (average) cash in the bank. The proportion of long and short-
term credit is optimized according to equation (11). 
 
V. Implications of the Model for the Financial Management of the Firm 
The model elaborated above demonstrates that firms can determine the optimal mix of 
short- and long-term bank debt. It assumes that the entrepreneurs have a clear understanding 
of the amount of finance they will need, and, according to their personal preferences, firm 
characteristics, etc., they decide exogenously how much finance to acquire via trade credit (if 
any). Then, they turn to the bank and here they can optimize the amount of short and long 
term bank debt, thereby minimizing their cost. The optimization formula has important impli-
cations. 
According to the formula, the optimum (that is, the proportion of short- and long-term 
bank debt) is not affected by the overall amount of debt needed since only relative interest 
rates are necessary in order to derive the proportion of short- and long-term debt. Thus, the 
proportion of short- and long-term bank debt for a firm that needs a small amount of bank 
debt and for a firm that needs a huge amount of bank debt is the same, as long as the interest 
rates and the probability distribution function of the finance required are the same. 
In general terms, when RS rr   increases with respect to RL rr  , (that is, when the in-
terest rate on short-term debt increases with respect to the interest rate on long-term debt), the 
value of the fraction reduces. This means that the firm should reduce the short-term debt by 
increasing the proportion of long-term bank debt. Thus, what affects the proportion of long- 
and short-term debt is the relative weight of short- and long-term interest rate. 
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In addition, the optimization formula implies that what is important is the net interest 
rate charged on both short- and long-debt; that is the difference between interest rates charged 
(on long- and short-term debt) and the interest rate paid by the bank on cash deposits. Thus, 
the interest rate the firm obtains on cash it has temporarily deposited in the bank impacts the 
optimal mix between short- and long-term debt; an increase in the interest rate on cash in the 
bank has a greater effect on the net long-term interest rate than on the net short-term interest 
rate since the long-term interest rate is smaller than the short-term rate. Thus, the relative 
weight of net short- and net long-term interest rate changes and the proportion of long-term 
debt will be bigger. In fact, if the firm receives a higher interest rate on the cash it has tempo-
rarily in the bank, the firm will be better off. In order to increase the amount of cash deposit-
ed in the bank, the firm has to increase the long-term debt, thereby reducing the number of 
days for which it needs short-term debt and increasing the number of days for which it has 
cash in bank (and the average amount of cash it has in bank, accordingly). 
The literature stresses that it is important to match the length of assets’ life and the 
maturity of liabilities (Heyman et al., 2008). The model elaborated in this paper provides par-
tial support for this proposition. In fact, a perfect match between assets’ life and debts’ ma-
turity is not necessarily achieved when the cost of finance is minimized. When a firm misuses 
short-term debt to finance long-term liabilities, it is likely to be charged a higher interest rate 
on short-term debt (because of the financial risk it incurs). In addition, because of the assets it 
holds, the firm would be able to gain long-term finance on good terms since it has assets that 
can be provided as collateral. Thus, such a firm can certainly reduce its cost of debt by opti-
mizing the debt structure according to the model elaborated in this paper (and this, irrespec-
tive of changes in interest rate charged because of the lower level of financial risk). Such a 
change will imply a reduction of short-term debt and an increase of long-term debt and the 
new debt structure will tend to time-match the assets’ structure. As a consequence, even if 
this model does not guarantee a perfect matching between assets’ life and debt maturity, it 
works in this direction. 
The optimization of the long-term/short-term bank debt mix is easier when the firm 
concentrates its banking relationships within one bank. The effect of concentrating banking 
relationships with one or a few banks is widely discussed in the literature (Neuberger et al., 
2008; Elsas, 2005; Angelini et al., 1998). Such concentration provides the bank with more 
information: it is less affected by information asymmetry and can reduce monitoring costs. If 
the bank passes such savings on to the firm, the firm is also better off. On the other hand, 
when small firms rely on one bank only, they may have reduced negotiating power. In such a 
situation, they may face problems switching to another bank because of the difficulties in 
providing a clear picture of their performance (Howorth et al., 2003). If the current bank is 
aware that it is not incurring the risk of losing the customer, it can avoid passing on part of 
the savings. In this case, small firms can be locked in, and worse off. 
Since debt optimization improves firm’s performance by reducing financial costs and 
by improving the match between assets life and debt maturity, it can help to overcome prob-
lems in providing a new bank with appropriate information. Thus, even if the model supports 
the logic of concentrating the relationship with one bank, it can help the small family-run 
firm to avoid lock-in situations by improving the quality of the relationship with the current 
bank and by simplifying switching to a new bank. 
The extended model enables the examination of the role of trust on debt structure. 
Since, in the model, trust affects only the short-term interest rate, trust level impacts only the 
denominator by reducing the short-term interest rate. In mathematical terms, trust affects the 
relative weight of short- and long-term interest rates by reducing the value of the short-term 
interest rate; that is, by increasing the value of the fraction in our model, (i.e. the negative 
proportion of D ). Thus, with higher levels of trust, the firm should reduce the long-term debt 
Andrea Moro,Mike R. Lucas, Uwe G. Grimm/The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance 16 
(2012) 
 
100 
 
and increase the short-term debt accordingly. This proposition raises an important question: is 
the firm capable of substituting long-term debt with short-term debt in order to optimize the 
debt structure? According to the model, the amount of short-term finance available to the 
firm is positively affected by the level of trust. Thus, firms should be able to access additional 
short-term debt in order to optimize the debt structure. 
Interestingly, the extended model has yet further implications. Short-term finance is a 
very flexible source of finance that can be used whenever the firm needs it. The possibility of 
using more short-term debt because of high levels of trust increases the flexibility of the firm. 
Empirical research indicates that SMEs tend to rely more on short-term debt than long-term 
debt because of their need for flexibility. In addition, short-term credit is found to be correlat-
ed with firm’s growth opportunities (García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2007). The model 
suggests that when firms are trusted by lenders, they can (and should) increase the proportion 
of short-term debt. The implication of the extended model is that less trusted firms should 
consolidate their debt into long-term debt possibly by collateralizing the long term debt with 
additional assets. Indeed, not only the cost of long term debt is relatively cheaper than the 
cost of short term debt for the low trusted firm but also the bank’s loan manager may be will-
ing to lend to the firm if it provides some additional collateral that compensates for the low 
level of trust they have in the entrepreneur. In other words, loan managers may be willing to 
lend to the low trusted firm by substituting additional collateral for trust, although Moro et al. 
(2012) do find a weak empirical correlation between trust and collateral request. In fact, less 
trusted firms are those which are more likely to face some reduction in access to finance in 
the future and particularly in harsh times. Thus, in order to avoid a credit constraint situation 
by both suppliers and banks, less trusted firms should build up a capital structure that is less 
flexible, by leveraging more long-term debt. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, it has been argued that the existing finance literature is incomplete with 
respect to the capital structure of SMEs, since its focus is on the debt-equity mix, which is 
inappropriate when shareholders are not happy to or cannot open the equity holding to new 
entrants. In such cases, equity has to be considered as a given and the focus should be on op-
timizing other primary sources of finance: trade credit and the mix of short- long-term bank 
debt. 
The model illustrated is based on optimizing the mix by minimizing the overall cost 
of debt. According to the model, SMEs firstly decide the amount of trade credit they wish to 
utilize. This amount is determined by considering the benefit they can gain by diversifying 
their sources of finance and the constraints in accessing bank finance on the one hand and the 
extra cost they have to pay for such a diversification on the other hand. Then, they have to 
turn their attention to bank debt and consider the differential between long- and short-term 
debt interest rates. Here, SMEs should choose the mix that minimizes the overall cost of debt. 
The basic model has also been extended by incorporating suppliers’ and bank manag-
ers’ trust in the SME. Previous literature has discussed the benefits of trust relationships for 
both the trustor and the trustee; such relationships can reduce the cost of monitoring, improve 
the commercial relationship, and reduce the bonding costs. High levels of trust can increase 
the amount of trade credit, both in good and in bad times (by extending the payment terms), 
even if trust does not affect the cost of trade credit. In addition, trust increases short-term 
credit access and it reduces the cost of short-term debt. Thus, according to the extended mod-
el, the higher the level of suppliers’ and banks’ trust in the SME, the greater the availability 
of both trade credit and short-term bank debt; the higher the trust, the more the firm should 
rely on short-term bank debt because of its reduced cost. All in all, highly trusted firms 
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should increase the proportion of short-term liabilities (trade and bank credit) in order to op-
timize their debt structure and might build up a more flexible capital structure. 
The issues raised in this paper also have implications for a future research agenda in 
related fields. Models for investment appraisal in SMEs (such as those based on the weighted 
average cost of capital) should try to incorporate the present approach in determining the ap-
propriate discount rate for discounted cash flow calculations. Thus, the development of dif-
ferent tools for evaluating SME projects could be an important area for future research. A dif-
ferent stream of research could be testing the extended model empirically. Some previous re-
search has tested the effect of trust on the cost of bank debt. It would be very interesting to 
measure the effect of trust relationships on the relative proportions of trade credit and short-
term and long-term debt used to finance SMEs. 
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